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NOTES

the validity of state anti-discrimination legislation. 40 It was but
a short step for the Court, under the prior jurisprudence, to
bring the regulation of public accommodations within the ambit
of the commerce power.
James F. Abadie

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

RELIGIOUS BELIEF NECESSARY FOR

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR EXEMPTION

Seeger claimed exemption as a conscientious objector under
section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act, which exempts from combatant duty in the Armed Forces
of the United States those persons who by reason of their religious belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in
war.' Seeger's conscientious objections were based on a belief
in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sake, and
a religious faith in a purely ethical creed. His local Selective
Service Board found his beliefs to be sincere and honest but
denied Seeger's claim because it was not based upon a "belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being" as required by the act. In
fact, Seeger was unwilling to assert or deny the existence of a
Deity. He refused to submit to induction and was subsequently
convicted in a federal district court. 2 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed on the grounds that the statute
limiting the conscientious objection to persons who believe in a
Supreme Being violated the due process clause of the fifth
amendment by creating an impermissible classification between
internally derived and externally compelled beliefs as applied
to one whose abhorrence of war was sincere and predicated on
religious training and belief.3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 4 and affirmed the result, but did not pass on the con40. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
1. 72 Stat. 711 (1958), 50 U.S.C. §456(J) (1964): "Nothing contained in
this title . . . shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant
training and service . . . who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and
belief in this connection means an individual's belief in relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but
does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views of a
merely personal moral code."
2. United States v. Seeger, 216 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).

3. United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
4. Certiorari was also granted in two other cases: United States v. Peter, 324

F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir.
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stitutional issue, preferring to place a construction on the statutory definition which avoided imputing to Congress an intent
to discriminate between religious beliefs. In finding that

Seeger's belief entitled him to an exemption, the Court held,
the test of religious belief within the meaning of the 6(j)
exemption is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that
filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies
for the exemption. 5 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Congress, in implementing its war powers and its inherent
authority as a sovereign to compel citizens to serve in the Armed
Forces,6 has long recognized the moral dilemma posed for those
of certain religious faiths by the call to arms.7 The Draft Act
of 1917 exempted conscientious objectors who were affiliated
with well-recognized religious sects whose tenets prohibited participation in war. The act required all to be inducted but allowed
the objectors to perform only noncombatant service. Although
the 1917 act excused only religious objectors belonging to established, traditionally pacifist sects, the Secretary of War instructed that "personal scruples against war" be considered as
constituting "conscientious objection."" In adopting the Selective Service Act of 1940, Congress broadened the exemption by
1963). These cases were consolidated for argument and disposed of together.
Neither of the companion cases involved unqualified skepticism. Jakobson and
Peter argued that their beliefs met the requirements of the act. Jakobson believed in "Goodness" as the "Ultimate Cause for Being" and a Supreme Being
who was the creator of man and the "Supreme Reality." Peter believed in a
moral code which forbade the taking of human life. He hedged on the question
as to his belief in a Supreme Being by saying that it depended on the definition.
5. Seeger, as described by the Court: "He was a product of a devout Roman
Catholic home; he was a close student of Quaker beliefs from which he said 'much
of his thought is derived'; he devoted his spare hours to the American Friends
Service Committee and was assigned to hospital duty." 380 U.S. 163, 186-87.
The Court concluded Seeger professed religious belief and religious faith and did
not disavow any belief "in relation to a Supreme Being; indeed he stated that
the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence." Id. at 187. In
answer to the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being Seeger said: "Of
course, the existence of God cannot be proven or disproven, and the essence of
his nature cannot be determined. I prefer to admit this and leave the question
open rather than answer 'yes' or 'no.' " 216 F. Supp. 516, 518.
6. The Supreme Court has categorically sustained the constitutionality of
conscription. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
7. For a historical survey of the conscientious objector exemption, see Smith &
Bell, The Conscientious Objector Program; A Search for Sincerity, 19 U. PITT.
L. Rav. 695 (1958) ; Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the United States, 20 Gao. WAsH. L. Ryv. 409 (1952) ; Note, 36 MINN.
L. REV. 65, 70-74 (19511.
8. Selective Service Memorandum 11-Conscientious Objection 54-55 (1950).
This act was upheld against constitutional attack. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245
U.S. 366 (1917).
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discarding the membership requirement of the 1917 act in order
to include any person who "by reason of religious training and

belief is conscientiously opposed to participation in war."9 In
construing the 1940 act, the Second Circuit held that a sincere
abhorrence of war as ethically wrong which proceeds from a
religious conviction, sufficed to meet the test of religious training and belief as set forth in the statute. 10 A diametrically opposite conclusion was reached by the Ninth Circuit in Berman
v. United States," which interpreted the statute as exempting
only those who believed in a Diety commanding abstinence from
war under pain of supernatural sanction.
In enacting section 6(j) of the 1948 act Congress, in an
apparent endeavor to resolve the conflict as to the proper interpretation of religious belief, explicitly defined religious training
and belief as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation.' 2 (Emphasis added.) This exemption was upheld
against constitutional challenges in the courts of several circuits
on the theory that the exemption was an act of legislative grace
and hence could be granted upon any condition which Congress
3
desired to impose.'
Adhering to the broad construction of the statute that it
developed prior to the 1948 amendment, the Second Circuit, in
Jakobson, found that belief in "goodness" as the "ultimate cause
of being" met the test of 6 (j)1 4 and criticized the Ninth Circuit's narrow construction in Berman.' 5 In Seeger, however,
9. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 20 Stat. 887.
10. United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United
States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943) ; United States v.
Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
11. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946).
12. 72 Stat. 711 (1958), 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1964). Section 6(j)'s language derived ultimately from the dissent in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S.
605, 611 (1931), where Chief Justice Hughes stated that the "essence of religion
is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relations." Justice Hughes' position in Macintosh was adopted to Girauard
v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), which overruled Macintosh.
13. Etcheverry v. United States, 320 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1963); Clark v.
United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Bendik, 220 F.2d
249 (2d Cir. 1955) ; George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1952).
14. The Second Circuit, in refusing to follow Bendik, Clark, George, and others;
was influenced by the Supreme Court's decision in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958), wherein that court pronounced that the legislative power to deny a
particular privilege does not imply an equivalent power to grant such a privilege
on unconstitutional conditions. This, in the opinion of the Second Circuit, sapped
the strength of the reasoning of the earlier cases.
15. "Moreover, the statutory definitions need not be regarded as precisely'
bounded by the Berman opinion when the compulsion to read it broadly is so
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the Second Circuit, in what seems to be a retreat from its broad
interpretation of 6(j) in Jakobson, held the exemption to be a
violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment in
that it created an impermissible classification between religious
beliefs. 16 The Ninth Circuit in Peter held that the local Selective Service Board had basis in fact for denial of conscientious
objector classification to Peter who was not a member of any
religious organization or sect and did not clearly manifest a
belief in a Supreme Being to whom he owed obedience. This
treatment of Peter indicates that the Ninth Circuit never departed from the rationale of Berman. As evidenced by these
three decisions, the 1948 amendment did not resolve the conflict.
This was the state of the law when the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Seeger, Jakobson, and Peter, and consolidated the cases for argument and disposition. Each raised the
basic question of the constitutionality of 6(j). The attack
launched under the first amendment was two-fold: (1) the section does not exempt non-religious conscientious objectors in
violation of the establishment clause, and (2) it discriminates
between different forms of religious expression in violation of
the free exercise clause and the fifth amendment's due process
clause. In addition Peter and Jakobson claimed their beliefs fit
within the exemption. The Supreme Court sidestepped the constitutional issues17 by reading the definition of "religious training and belief" in 6(j) as broadly as the words would permit,
and concluded that under the Court's enunciation of the test
Seeger, Peter, and Jakobson were entitled to the exemption.
The heart of the problem was to discern and articulate what
Congress meant when it defined "religious training and belief"
as "belief in relation to a Supreme Being." The Solicitor Genstrong. A contemporary theologian of high distinction and wide influence, who
has taught at great universities on both sides of the Atlantic, Professor Paul
Tillich, has written of God in terms that would surely embrace Jakobson's beliefs.

As the footnote shows, Jakobson's definition of religion as 'the sum and essence
of one's basic attitude to the fundamental problems of human existence' and his
insistence that man can know nothing of God and that Goodness can be approached only through psychic involvement in reality parallel the views of this

eminent theologian rather strikingly. We cannot believe that Congress, aware of
the constitutional problem, meant to exclude views of this character from its definition of religion." 325 F.2d 409, 415 (2d Cir. 1963).
16. For a detailed review of the Second Circuit's decisions in Seeger and
Jakobson, see Note, 64 COLUxM. L. REV. 938 (1964).
17. In so doing the Court was merely following the time-honored principle
of construing a statute to avoid "grave and doubtful" constitutional questions.
See United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (1909).

1965]

NOTES

eral, arguing for the Government, insisted that the statutory
language adopted in 1948 rejected the Second Circuit's broad
definition and accepted the narrow approach adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in Berman. In rejecting the Government's contention, the Court recognized the intensely elusive nature of the
inquiry, but in reviewing the legislative history was most emphatic in its opinion that the statute was not meant to be restrictive in application and available only to those who held
traditional beliefs in God. In using the expression "Supreme
Being," Congress, according to the Court, was merely clarifying
the meaning of "religious training and belief" in order to embrace all religions. The Court concluded that section 6(j) of
1948 was no more than a clarification of the 1940 provision
involving only technical amendments, and as such, continued the
congressional policy of providing exemption from military service for those whose opposition is based on grounds that can
fairly be said to be religious. The opinion recognized that Congress adopted almost intact the language of Chief Justice
Hughes' dissent in United States v. Macintosh, the "essence of
religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior
to those arising from any human relation."' 8 However, the
Court felt that the single departure from the phraseology of
Macintosh was entitled to great weight. The substitution of the
phrase "Supreme Being" for Hughes' appellation "God" was
interpreted as an expression of liberal intent and a mandate
for broad construction. 19 Considerable discussion was devoted
to theological views concerning the meaning of "Supreme
Being," and the Court utilized legislative history in the context
of the American religious tradition to discern the meaning.
Religion in the United States is characterized by diversity, Justice Clark reasoned, and a tolerant Congress would never have
formulated an inflexible definition of religion in the face of
our national heritage of multifarious creeds. The Court also
noted the evolution in orthodox theology and pointed out that
many modern churchmen have expressed much of the same ethic
that motivated Seeger. The Court concluded that its construc18. 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931).
19. The Court easily disposed of the Government's argument that since Berman
was cited in the Senate Report on the 1948 act, Congress must have intended to
adopt the Berman interpretation of "religious belief," by finding that Congress
cited Berman, not for what it said the "religious belief" was, but for what it said
"religious belief" was not, i.e., claim based solely on political, sociological, or
philosophical views.
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tion of the statute embraced the ever-expanding ecumenism of
the modern religious community.
Under the Court's test the exemption is extended to anyone
having a sincere objection to war derived from a belief based
upon a power or a being or upon a faith to which all else is subordinated, or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The
statute excepts from the exemption those registrants whose beliefs are based on a "merely personal moral code." The Supreme
Court, having interpreted the exemption broadly to avoid a serious constitutional question, proceeded to interpret narrowly the
exception to the exemption, and held the term "merely personal"
restricted the exception to a moral code which is not only peculiar to the applicant but which is the sole basis for the applicant's belief and is in "no way related to a Supreme Being."
Consequently, when the Court applies its test for belief in a Supreme Being, a registrant who sincerely places an absolute value
in a personal belief could be outside the ambit of the "merely
personal" exception.
As a result of Seeger the respective Selective Service Boards
now have an articulated, avowedly flexible test to guide them.
The question will be one of fact: Does the registrant have a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in his life a place
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of those admittedly qualified for exemption? Or, paraphrasing Justice
Douglas' concurring opinion: Is the registrant opposed to war
on the basis of a sincere belief which in his life fills the same
place as the belief in God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist?
Congress has not as yet reacted to the Supreme Court's decision in Seeger and it is unlikely that it will quarrel with the
Court's enunciation of congressional intent, primarily because
any definition restricting the conscientious objector exemption
to those with a traditional belief in God would not conform to
the requirements of the first and fifth amendments. 20 The Su20. In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 490 (1961), the Supreme Court
struck down as invalid a state statute requiring notary publics to affirm their
belief in the existence of God. The government cannot, the Torcaso court declared,
place the power and authority of the state "on the side of one particular sort of
believers - those who are willing to say that they believe in the existence of
God." See United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943); see also
Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the: Light of Torcaso vs:
Watkins, 51 GEo. L.J. 252, 256-57 (1963).
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preme Court, by tradition, avoids constitutional issues by con21
struing questionable legislation within constitutional limits.
The ultimate worth of Seeger lies in the utility of the test
enunciated by the Court. 22 This test conforms to the congressional policy of placing primary responsibility for determining
Selective Service status with the local boards which are in the
best position to judge sincerity and ascertain the nature of the
beliefs ;23 but the Court did not state in what way the applicant's
belief must be parallel to a belief in God. 24 It is quite possible
that this may lead to inequalities in application as the touchstone appears to lack selectivity. Marxism, existentialism, and
anarchism could fit under the umbrella. 25 An anarchist, for example, might have a pervading faith in a moral urge intrinsic
in man that is powerful enough to survive the destruction of authority. Such an anarchist would believe that the state and its
works undermine this urge and would therefore be conscientiously opposed to war because it is a state activity. 26 His beliefs
would appear to be within the ambit of the court's test although
they would ordinarily be classified as political.
Edwin K. Hunter
21. Cf. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943).
22. If the test proves so broad as to seriously reduce the military manpower
or so subjective as to adversely affect the morale of the armed forces, then it may
be necessary to reformulate the "conscientious objector" exemption. Congress, in
an effort to avoid constitutional difficulty, might well find it wise to return to
the test of 1917, note 26 infra, which could be sustained as an evidentiary requirement of sincerity rather than a religious test. Cf. Note, 48 MINN. L. REV. 771,
776 (1964).
23. The Director of the Selective Service System has broad discretion (32
C.F.R. 1622:60, 1962) and no classification is permanent (32 C.F.R. 1651:1).
The Selective Service authorities are not required to accept without inquiry a mere
statement of religious tenets. They are empowered to inquire concerning sincerity
and good faith to the end that the law shall not be a shield for the hypocrite or
the faker.
24. The local Selective Service Boards are now faced with the problem of
determining what the Court meant by parallel. A number of possible parallels
are suggested. Must it be parallel in ritual, in faith, in transcendental experience, in influencing behavior or molding a world-view? Ritual is shared as much
by ceremonies of state as by religion. Faith, in the sense of acquiescence to certain postulates, is common to science and religion. Laws and customs influence
behavior as effectively as religion. A political philosophy can mold a world-view.
Is the definition of parallel any less difficult than the definition of belief in a
Supreme Being?
25. The task of finding a common denominator for all forms of religious beliefs without including those beliefs which are basically economic, political, or
philosophical is extremely difficult. For a review of the problem see HUXLEY,
RELIGION WITHOUT REVELATIONS (1948), where "the sentiment of sacredness" is
adopted as the ultimate definition.
26. During World War I the Draft Act exempted only objectors who were
members of a recognized, established religious sect "whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war." However, executive orders and

